












be	 as	 epistemically	 competent	 as	 him	 or	 epistemically	 superior	 to	 him),	 he	must	 be	willing	 –	 in	
exchange	for	a	positive	and	certain	payment	–	to	accept	an	offer	to	let	a	completely	rational	and	








































that	 would	 justify	 rejecting	 a	 sure	 gain.	 A	 prominent	 Conciliatory	 view,	 the	 “split	 the	 difference”	 view,	
requires	peers	to	converge	on	the	average	of	the	difference	in	degree	of	belief	that	they	find	between	them.	






Surprisingly,	 the	EW	view	on	 the	split	 the	difference	 interpretation	 fails	 to	meet	 the	constraint	we	offer.	
Moreover,	our	argument	applies	equally	well	to	EW	views	that	at	least	sometimes	–	but	not	always	–	require	
that	peers	split	the	difference	and	converge	(or	come	close	to	converging).4		
















































































restrictions	 on	 ci(P|X),	 (i.e.	 on	 i’s	 conditional	 degree	 of	 belief	 in	 P	 given	 that	 j	 believes	 P	 to	 degree	 x).	





will	have	on	ci(P|X).	 “Linear	Pooling”	 is	 the	name	given	 in	 the	 literature	 to	one	possible	 (but	prominent)	
restriction	on	this	function:		























































































































Now,	 it	does	not	make	sense	 for	 i	 to	pay	a	price	 just	 so	 that	 the	choice	will	be	 taken	using	a	probability	
function	that	i	himself	views	as	an	inferior	one,	and	it	does	not	make	sense	for	him	to	decline	a	certain	payoff	
just	so	that	the	choice	will	be	taken	using	a	probability	function	that	he	himself	views	as	a	superior	one.	In	





























































































































that	discusses	 the	problem	of	probabilistic	opinion	pooling	using	an	axiomatic	 approach.15	This	 literature	
identifies	several	different	sets	of	axioms	that	uniquely	pick	out	different	methods	of	pooling.	The	LP	method,	
for	example,	is	the	only	pooling	method	that	respects	the	following	two	axioms:	(1)	Unanimity	Preservation:	
if	all	the	agents	to	which	i	assigns	a	positive	weight	have	the	same	degree	of	belief	 in	P	as	 i,	 i	should	not	





















As	 explained	 in	 section	 1	 the	main	 idea	 behind	 the	 EEI	 is	 that,	 on	 the	 assumption	 that	 j	 is	 rational	 and	
sympathetic	to	 i	 (which	we	stipulate	 is	believed	to	degree	1	by	 i),	the	only	difference	between	j	choosing	


























































Proponents	 of	 linear	 pooling	 cannot,	 however,	make	 this	move	 because	 they	 believe	 that	 once	 one	 has	
decided	to	treat	another	person	as	one’s	peer	with	respect	to	P,	that	person’s	degree	of	belief	in	P	will	have	
the	same	impact	no	matter	what	it	turns	out	to	be	(at	least	within	a	range	of	values).	This	is	the	essence	of	






























the	 evidence	 (that	 they	 share)	 on	 their	 degree	 of	 belief	 that	 P,	 the	 weight	 i	 assigns	 to	 j	 should	 not	 be	
independent	of	j’s	reasoning.	
	
































response	 to	 the	discovery	of	peer	disagreement,	 it	 seems	possible	 to	construct	cases	where	 the	possible	
values	are	balanced	 in	 such	a	way	 that	an	agent	will	 know	 that	 she	disagrees	with	her	peer	but	will	not	
thereby	be	required	to	change	her	credence	before	discovering	what	the	disagreement	is.				
					
Related	 to	 the	previous	objection	 is	 the	 claim	 that	 the	 credence	 function	 c(•)	 should	not	 contain	X-type	
propositions	 at	 all	 (i.e.	 hypothesis	 about	 j's	 degree	 of	 belief	 in	 P).	 The	 motivation	 for	 this	 is	 that	 the	
assumption	that	agents	always	start	from	a	prior	probability	distribution	that	is	defined	over	an	algebra	that	
contains	all	Xs	 is	so	demanding	that	 it	makes	any	conclusion	that	 is	based	on	it	practically	 insignificant.	A	
Bayesian	alternative	is	to	argue	that,	upon	learning	agent	j’s	degree	of	belief	in	P,	 i	updates	his	degree	of	
belief	in	P	in	a	way	that	gives	the	required	LP	view	value,	and	then	after	this	initial	change	he	updates	his	











(as	 opposed	 to	 discussing	 what	 the	 conditional	 credences	 should	 be).	 Thus,	 when	 real	 people	 learn	
propositions	such	as	X	they	usually	do	not	have	a	prior	conditional	probability	for	P	given	X	to	refer	to.	We	











by	 a	 non-conditionalization	 rule	 or	 by	 an	 anti-conditionalization	 rule.	 We	 have	 no	 problem	 with	 non-
conditionalization	rules	as	such,	but	we	think	they	do	not	avoid	the	argument.	After	adopting	such	a	rule	one	
would	 still	 need	 to	 show	 how	 the	 argument	 is	 avoided	 with	 regard	 to	 cases	 that	 overlap	 with	
conditionalization.	We	do	have	a	problem,	however,	with	anti-conditionalization	rules.	In	fact,	as	much	as	
we	like	our	EEI	constraint,	we	think	adopting	an	anti-conditionalization	rule	is	a	higher	theoretical	price	to	
pay	than	rejecting	 it	simply	because	it	doesn’t	accord	with	the	LP	view.	That	 is,	simply	biting	the	bullet	 is	
better	here.		
	
To	 conclude,	what	 seems	clear	 is	 that	 linear	pooling	–	 the	 independence	of	 the	weight	 from	 the	agent’s	
degree	of	belief	–	has	unacceptable	consequences	precisely	because	of	this	independence.	Unless	you	assign	
a	weight	of	1	or	0	to	the	opinion	of	another	agent,	learning	what	this	other	agent’s	opinion	is	must	effect	–	







































































7. 𝑐 𝑃 𝑌 = ! ." 5! 6 '(785)("/"01∗ ! 3 = 𝑤𝑐 𝑝 + (1 − 𝑤) ! ." ("/"01∗! 3 	
	
Let	us	now	define	𝑍 = ! ." ("/"01∗! 3 	and	we	get:	
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